Monday, November 14, 2016

A Marshallian Theory of the Firm VII (Microeconomics)

Cascading Temporal Horizons in Capital Investment: Managing the Integration of New Production Factors over Multiple Temporal Frames

If we accept the idea that Marshallian firms operate under multiple, concentric, overlapping temporal frames, each shaped by differential capacities to alter or amend their rental/contracting/investment and integration/utilization of production factors, then we should be able to specify a schedule under which the relative variability of each production factor can be assessed.  Accordingly, any change in short (or very short) term market conditions, anticipated repetitions in cyclical patterns, or long term imperatives in strategic planning of market engagement/penetration should be accompanied either by a relatively truncated or a relatively expansive list of variable factors, mapping into the firm's production function.  At any moment within the longer history of the firm's engagement with its relevant markets, its entrepreneurial decision-maker(s) would stand in the shortest operative period within which to make relevant production decisions, but the firm would also exist at the cusp of future periods in which it could bring new assets to bear in commodity production.  Thus, the firm's decisions on factor utilization might continuously reflect its most truncated lists of variable factors, but it must simultaneously account for investment in factors that it will, only at some designated point in the future, treat as fixed.  
             It is at this moment that we are critically turning a corner on the temporal problem underlying the Marshallian firm and separating such firms from the abstract theoretic manifestation of a timeless, spaceless Walrasian/Paretian firm.  If both Marshallian and Walrasian/Paretian firms must be viewed as rational, profit maximizing/cost minimizing agents, then only the latter receive the privilege of realizing global profit maximizing/cost minimizing solutions in relation to the mathematical terms of their production functions.  Marshallian entrepreneurs operate as rational agents bounded by temporal and spatial constraints through which global profit maxima may be unattainable for any (or every) given production period. Marshallian firms negotiate technological and market conditions marked by continuous change in which their investment strategies may never bear fruit if, by the time capital investments come on line, production processes and/or consumer preferences have decisively changed.  As such, we will argue, over the course of this section, for a perspective on capital investment grounded in the post-Keynesian conception of fundamental uncertainty
            Let us approach the problem here with an example.  Say that we have a firm engaged in fabricating plastic forms through injection molding, a common industrial operation to manufacture a range of plastic components of various sizes and specifications.  The firm in question operates on short term contracts with numerous downstream manufacturers in automotive, energy, transportation, and consumer product industries, specifying the volume and delivery timelines for each respective production run.  It generates proprietary molds in house for each production run through wire electrical discharge machines (EDM) from detailed specifications supplied by contracting firms.  Some of its production runs are relatively small, producing finite quantities of customized components for detailed manufacturing projects by one of its clients.  Others involve repetitive contracting on reasonably constant design specifications for regular returning clients, where continuities in mold design over consecutive production runs generate cost savings for clients.  With a mix of simultaneous production runs for recurring designs and customized short run projects, the firm is able to regulate its operations to maintain a fairly constant stream of production across multiple projects on a weekly basis.  Its primary variable production factor on a weekly basis remains not labor but plastic intermediate materials.  Generating products from a range of thermoplastic materials (e.g. acrylic, polypropylene, polycarbonate, etc.), the firm must manage inventories of molding materials based on weekly production schedules.  In the mold production process, it must likewise manage supplies of aluminum and other composite metals for forming in the EDM process.  
          The firm's management of human resources, by contrast, figures as a relatively longer term constraint on the firm's ability to maintain continuous production.  The most highly skilled personnel work in the design shop, utilizing three-dimensional computer design/printing technologies to generate detailed mold designs from computer aided drafting (CAD) blueprints supplied by clients.  Beyond the mold design process, human resources utilized by the firm tend to include largely semi-skilled machine tenders.  The wire EDM tool-making process is automated and the injection molding process itself is automated, with minimal involvement by machine operators and tool-setting staff.  Training time in the latter processes is minimal but not inconsequential.  Errors in programming wire EDM machinery in the mold production process, in setting up A and B side tools on injection mold machines, or selecting appropriating clamping force for the charge materials used can lead to significant costs from damage to materials or machinery and defective products.  An extended on-the-job training protocol is maintained for all production personnel, with detailed supervisory training as new technologies are integrated in fabrication and production control.  It suffices to say that the firm may be able to procure more polycarbonate granules for the injection process overnight if production operations leave its supplies depleted, but it cannot as easily replace the labor services of a few machine operators or tool setters if they become unavailable either because of a work stoppage or acute retention problems.  
            Then there is machinery.  This firm, like every other manufacturing firm in the fabrication of plastics, is automation intensive.  In the mold production process, the firm operates a number of EDM die sinking and wire EDM machines to produce precisely detailed aluminum and composite molds to the exact specification demanded by clients.  In the molding process, it operates twelve separate injection molding machines of divergent clamping force ranges.  Precisely, it may not be an industry giant, but it is capable as an actor within its own geographic and design market niche.  On the other hand, as committed entrepreneurial actors, the firm's proprietors seek to expand beyond its specific limitations by investing in new machinery and more advanced technologies and by expanding their base of clients to realize a return on their investments.  In this manner, the firm manages its long term market strategies around the integration of new capital equipment, enabling it to undertake projects that it is currently incapable of completing and to take on multiple concurrent projects of larger sizes.  
             Patterning the firm's production function around the availability of its current supplies of intermediate plastics and aluminum plates, the availability of diverse forms of skilled/semi-skilled labor, and the integration of existing and new machinery, we get a series of nested temporal optimization processes that, invariably, become collapsed into overlapping frames of decision making by the firm's proprietors.  For our purposes, however, we can break down the separate optimization processes in order to define, separately, what the firm is actually doing to maximize profits and minimize costs, subject to fixed factor limitations, at each temporal frame.  To begin, if we generalize the intermediate materials (plastic granules, aluminum plate, etc.) as a single, homogeneous factor of production m that exists in a continuously variable form, then we can set up an initial stage of a broader optimization process by arguing that the firm varies its quantities of intermediate materials against a relatively fixed quantity of labor services l and a fixed quantity of capital machinery k.  We can pattern this problem graphically below, with quantities of the factor m on the horizontal axis, outputs as a function of m, l, and k, on the vertical axis, and quantities of l and k held fixed at all points along our total product curve.   

       Figure 17: Total Product Varying Intermediate Materials m Against Fixed Labor l and Fixed Capital k  
In this manner, we vary intermediate materials to four separate levels as multiples of a base level.  Intuitively, we might reason that initial increases in marginal productivity of the factor m arise as a result progressive utilization of the fixed factors l and k.  At very low levels of employment of intermediate materials, skilled and semi-skilled labor may remain idle of significant portions of the work day and EDM and injection molding machines may remain wholly out of use.  As we increase quantities of intermediate transformative materials, we increase the productivity of labor and machinery and, in conjunction, the marginal productivity from additional quantities of intermediate materials increases.  This subset of the optimization problem necessarily has a maximum, where the average product of the factor m is equal to its marginal product.  In this case, the maximum occurs around level four, as illustrated by a ray from the origin, denoting the highest attainable locus of constant average products of m, which is tangent to the total product curve at a single, highest point, in figure 18. 

Figure 18:  Maximization of Average Product of Intermediate Materials m at level 4.
The point of tangency of the ray from the origin with the total product curve in figure 18 indicates that we have a unique global profit maximum/cost minimum for this level of capital k and labor l, varying quantities of intermediate materials m alone.  Beyond this maximum, increases in the integration of transformative materials can only generate a diminishing stream of marginal products.  Logically, the accumulation of larger and larger inventories of intermediate materials, beyond the capacity of labor and capital to transform into finished outputs, must lower both the average and marginal products of m, even if it does not reach a point where marginal products become negative.  
            This problem, conceivably, constitutes the daily, weekly, or, at most, monthly decision set for the firm, as it decides what quantities of intermediate materials it needs to hold in inventories for production beyond longer term considerations on staffing and long run investments in machinery.  Acknowledging the relative simplicity of this decision, problems arise as we integrate successive higher/longer time frames.  Again, the firm operates within a context where its production planning horizon is strictly limited.  Any decision that it makes on the transformation of scale, through investment in its longer term factors of production, must be supported by some expectation that it can reap a return on its investments by increasing its sales volumes to existing clients or by bringing in new clients.  Conversely, it may be the case that the firm's proprietors recognize that some investments can be made, under its current and recurring portfolio of projects, to improve its efficiency of operations, reducing factor costs per unit of output.  This is a recognition that the firm, within a Marshallian theoretic, undertakes a recurring reexamination of operations to determine whether it is at a global profit maximum/cost minimum in relation to all production factors under circumstances where technological possibilities for production efficiencies are simultaneously changing.  In one conceivable circumstance, the firm's proprietors may determine that they can reduce average costs per unit of output by increasing the quantity of labor services employed and achieve gains from greater specialization of existing production staff.  Such a strategy hearkens back to the image of the Smithean pin factory and to Frederick Winslow Taylor's dogma of scientific management.  If we superimpose a set of total product curves against our existing total product schedule for the factor m, where each new total product curve represents the change in the total product schedule as we undertake discrete and proportional increases in the quantity of labor employed by the firm, then we can come to some graphical approximation of how the firm might be able to make gains in output by substituting discrete quantities of l for m.  

Figure 19: Total Product Variations Adding Discrete and Proportional Quantities of Labor l, Holding Capital k Constant 
The suggestion here is that our initial short run profit maximizing/cost minimizing outcome in terms of m does not take into account the extent to which the firm can gain outputs by substituting discrete quantities of a relatively less variable factor over longer time frames for quantities of its most variable factor.  If the quantity of labor hired by the firm is relatively less mutable at very short run intervals than the quantity of intermediate, transformative materials, then our firm can always vary the quantities of plastics and aluminum plate in its inventories but can only alter the quantity of labor it uses subject to its capacity to reorganize the utilization of labor in production and to supply new hires with the rudimentary quantities of training they will need to undertake their roles in production.  However, when it does integrate new workers and reorganize production, it can increase total output while reducing waste in the use of intermediate materials.  In accord with figure 19, the firm can raise total product and reduce total use of intermediate materials by making five proportional increases in labor, ending at level li6.  
             The manner in which I have drawn figure 19, further, seeks to make an argument with regard to the substitution of labor for intermediate materials.  For every discrete, proportional increase in the quantity of labor services in figure 19, the total product curve in terms of m pivots inward total the quantity axis, denoting the fact that our substitution will yield an increase in total product for every quantity of m consumed as a result of our integration of increased quantities of labor services.  These increases in total product are not, however, proportional for each of our discrete changes in l.  That is to say, our first increase in labor services yields more additional output than our second increase, and so forth (i.e. the marginal productivity of labor services against a fixed base of capital machinery diminishes as we substitute labor services for intermediate materials).  Even as we decrease the amount of m required to produce higher quantities of output, our capacity to substitute l for m is diminishing as we proceed, and it is likely that we will reach a maximum at which no additional increases in labor services relative to intermediate materials, under a fixed base of capital machinery, will yield increased outputs.  
          The relationship between l, m, and total outputs could similarly be patterned in three dimensions by means of isoquant level curves that would be convex with respect to the output origin, tailing off asymptotically toward the m and l axes into infinity for each level of total output (figure 20).  Here, holding to an assumption that the firm's financial constraint (i.e. its total budget for hiring factors of production) remains fixed as we substitute one set of production factors for another (and, thus, holding relative factor prices constant, we remain on a single isocost curve), selection of relatively more efficient factor combinations leads us to a point of tangency between the isocost curve/financial constraint and the highest attainable isoquant curve (I3 in figure 20).  Thus, for every set of relative prices for the production factors, we must have a global profit maximizing/cost minimizing point for every temporal interval in which we can treat each of the factors as variable.  
  


             
Figure 20: Labor and Intermediate Materials Factor Optimization Problem Expressed through Isoquant/Isocost Curves
Finally, we have to expand our analysis to incorporate successive factor substitutions on longer and longer time frames.  That is to say, the firm must always be attentive toward the possibilities for investment in new capital machinery of the sort that will potentially enable it to bid on new projects, expanding its base of short term and regular clients.  Precisely, the injection molding machines currently utilized by the firm may be especially conducive to a certain range of products that the firm regularly fabricates for clients.  No doubt, some other fabrications may be entirely beyond its capacity to manufacture if, for example, the clamping force of its machines is incompatible with the technical specification of manufacturing certain parts.  In the end, the firm's proprietors are continuously considering how to deal with manufacturing problems in the injection molding process and the EDM/wire EDM manufacture of molds/tools in order to achieve long run growth in the firm's client base or, in the very least, to ensure that the firm will be capable of maintaining its current repertoire of clients in the event that its available machines require replacement.     
           Having already conveyed two distinct graphical representations on factor substitution in a two-factor case, adding a third factor to assess the differential impacts of adding new capital equipment becomes conceptually more difficult.  Approaching this problem both abstractly and in reference to the potential real effects of investment in new machinery, let us say that the firm's proprietors conclude that, given present demand for the firm's outputs and expectations for increased demand for plastic fabrications among the firm's current client base, they could stand to profit from investment in a new hydraulic injection molding machine with a clamping force around 175 tons.  Investing in such a machine will, optimally, demand three to four new machine operating staff over the existing production schedule, increase the use of intermediate plastic materials by ten to fifteen percent per day, and increase the use of aluminum and composite materials in mold production by ten to twenty percent, contingent on the realization of new production contracts or expansion of existing ones.  Conversely, they expect that such an investment will increase gross revenues (accounting for potential increased contracting) by around twenty percent and revenues net of increased operating costs by three to five percent.  Finally, the incorporation of a new hydraulic injection molding machine will only be realized in three weeks time.  The model, itself, may be relatively generic, but it must still be spatially integrated into the firm's production facility and connected to existing infrastructure.  Beyond the basic market reality of the machine's purchase by the firm, these details take time, as will formal training in the operation of the new machine to the firm's machine tenders by staff from the manufacturer.
            Holding in mind these expectations on the firm's performance relative to its potential new investment, we can conceivably sort through a set of abstract differential relations, mapped out by the firm's unspecified production function.  In the most abstract sense, the firm's production function can be denoted as:



With marginal products:

  
  
   

Where a is the marginal product of intermediate materials, b is the marginal product of labor services, and c is the marginal product of capital machinery.  We can safely assume that, within relevant ranges of output, each of these marginal products has a positive value, even if values approach zero or become negative on other ranges, holding other factors constant.  Moreover, we can assume that the second order partial derivatives for each of the factors, in terms of itself, will be negative for relevant ranges (i.e. diminishing marginal productivity).  However, assuming that each of the factors operates as a relative complement to the others, in a three factor case, the situation with mixed partials becomes cloudy.  
           If the firm adds a new injection molding machine, in the absence of any changes to labor services hired or intermediate material inventories, it may increase total outputs but the substantial addition of new machine hours to its production schedule will introduce a steeply diminished marginal productivity of capital.  That is to say, without additional staffing, machine tenders and tool-setters will have a more difficult time operating an additional machine and regulating use of plastic intermediate materials for optimal efficiency.  There may be more waste of plastics and, in any case, the firm will more rapidly diminish its existing inventories of plastics in the absence of some increase in purchasing.  Fundamentally, an increase in capital machinery must be accompanied by both an increase in purchasing of intermediate materials and an increase in staffing if the firm is to maximize profits from its investment.  Here, again, as suggested above, the firm's proprietors already have entertained the possibility that investment in a new injection molding machine will require higher utilization of labor services (three to four machine tenders) and intermediate materials, both for plastics (ten to fifteen percent per day) and metallic plates (ten to twenty percent).  It is conceivable, in this respect, that multiple profit maximizing factor combinations exist for the injection molding process at different production scales and that this firm has simply selected one possible multi-factor expansion path, but, having selected this particular expansion path, it must now manage its multi-factor investment and utilization schedule over time to ensure that it is maximizing profits, particularly with respect to the factors that are least variable over time and, hence, constitutive of its hardest constraints on output variation.
           The idea that there may be multiple profit maximizing combinations, involving, especially, different ensembles of capital equipment and skilled or semi-skilled labor services, potentially takes us beyond the image of the Walrasian/Paretian general equilibrium system in which all firms in a given production process select identical profit maximizing factor combinations.  The latter idea constitutes a rationalist oversimplification, but if we concede a certain level of nuance to production processes for relatively homogeneous goods and services, we have to recognize that variations in production factors must exist, and that such variations may generate marginal cost advantages for certain firms.  If, at every moment, all firms in a given market are attempting to achieve all available reductions in production costs, the innate imperfections of information on production technologies in a Marshallian economy must constitute an experiential environment in the selection of particular combinations of labor and capital.  Remaining on the theme of plastic injection molding, for example, certain firms overwhelmingly utilize hydraulic injection molding machines while others have updated to incorporate partial/hybrid or fully electric models.  Selection between such models is highly contextual, with fully electric models enjoying an advantage for certain high volume, high precision processes and in regions where rates for electric power are relatively low.  Firms specializing in plastic components for medical procedures where consistency tolerances are extremely tight tend to utilize fully electric injection molding machines.  Production for certain other downstream processes are more readily handled by hydraulic machines.  The mix of clients involved for individual firms, thus, determines the particular technologies employed, but, to the extent that overlaps exist between subsets of the larger market in plastic fabrications, it may be true that certain firms select factor combinations that are relatively efficient given their in house capital equipment even such factor combinations are not globally efficient across the larger industry for the particular components manufactured.  In the end, capital investment decisions by particular firms at every temporal period must reflect the particular range of their client portfolio, in injection molding and in every other business field.
           Integration time is another important consideration here.  That is to say, we need to consider how long it take the firm to fully incorporate any particular capital investment.  In the case of intermediate materials, investments are incorporated immediately - plastic pellets and metallic plates can immediately be injected into their respective role in the production process once they are received by the firm.  In the case of labor services, there has to be some nominal on-the-job training period to integrate staff into their roles.  In the case of new equipment, integration of machinery is a prolonged process, from purchase to manufacture, in accordance with specific details, to transportation, to installation, to training of staff, to full formal utilization.  In the case of our firm, we have posited the possibility that the machinery purchased conforms to a standard model, without any detailed changes.  Even accepting such conditions, the integration of new capital machinery is an extended process, especially where its use significantly reshapes the operation of the firm.  
          Emphatically, in our case, if the purchase of a new injection molding machine increases the range of production processes open to the firm, then formal integration sets the timeline in which personnel can procure new contracts for projects not available to the firm before the machinery was purchased.  On the other hand, at the time in which the firm's proprietors make the decision to invest in new machinery, the potential to realize new projects that will make their investment profitable remains fundamentally uncertain.  The proprietors cannot fully diagnose the profitability of an investment that may take several months or longer to integrate into production based on market conditions that do not exist at the time in which the investment was made.  Under such circumstances, the proprietors, as investors, are constrained to undertake as much research into contemporaneous technological and market conditions that will enable them to make an educated guess as to whether they are apt to profit from procuring new machinery.  The insoluble nature of risk here ultimately constitutes a singular justification/rationale for the existence of normal profit as a return to willingness of entrepreneurs to undertake capital investments under inherently risky/uncertain conditions.         
           Reflecting briefly on the image of differential expansion paths shaped by investments in particular very short, short/intermediate, and long term variable production factors, liquidity is a significant concern for the firm's proprietors as they move forward.  Every investment in production factors transforms a relative liquid capital asset (e.g. retained cash earnings) into a relatively illiquid asset (e.g. an inventory of polycarbonate and polypropylene pellets, liability to pay a week's earnings for an additional machine tender or to pay contractual salary obligations for mold designer, sunk investment costs for an additional injection molding machine inclusive of interest on financing).  In some way, the total product generated by each investment in an illiquid asset must at least equilibrate the potential return for alternative uses of liquid capital assets (e.g. lending through financial intermediaries or purchase of debt or equity-based securities).  At this point, our analysis of the Marshallian firm begins crossing the threshold into the derivative terrain of traditional Keynesian theory and, even more, of post-Keynesian theory, where we acknowledge that the microeconomic contexts in which firms operate are situated within and mediated through financial systems in which alternative uses of capital must shape very basic business decisions for firms on every level of an economy.  It might be easy for our firm in this section to regulate its investment in human resources over the course of one or two months in response to shifts in profitability of its production processes, but how easy it is to disinvest in a new injection molding machine?  A ready market may exist for used industrial equipment, but how fully can the firm expect to recoup its initial investment by liquidating an asset through such a market?  Likewise, the firm probably can rely on wholesale suppliers of intermediate materials to buy back unused, non-perishable inventories, but at how much of a discount?  The fact that every investment in illiquid factor assets constrains the firm to utilize them productively over a particular temporal period over which the firm does not manifest perfect knowledge on market conditions means that the firm must simultaneously concern itself with the capacity of each asset to be liquidated in the future.   
           The critical point is that none of the investment decisions here can be made in the abstract.  They are all outcomes of an analytical process, undertaken by the firm's proprietors, to evaluate the potential for increased revenues against increased costs under different mixes of production factors, variable in accordance with different temporal frames, all considered in relation to the firm's portfolio of client projects and the potential to gain returns from alternative (non-productive/financial) uses of capital.  We should not, in this manner, construe that entrepreneurial decisions are either the outcomes of intensive, determined research or that such decisions are factually simplistic and mechanical.  Rather, the work of entrepreneurs in planning capital investments, on divergent and overlapping time frames, is continuously practical to the work of their businesses and, as such, reflects the recurring degrees of skill and intellectual ability manifest in the day-to-day negotiation of particular market contexts. 
          Summarizing the arguments of this section:
1.  Planning of investments in production factors by entrepreneurs is continuous and involves overlapping temporal frameworks, with certain factors more variable along shorter timelines than others.
2.  The basic framework of production analysis (i.e. production functions with multiple, discrete factor combinations and roughly determinate output ranges), accounting for differential temporal variability of individual factors, constitutes the foundation for analysis of capital investments along divergent timelines.   
3.  On shorter timelines, firms are more capable of deploying contemporaneous information on production technologies, consumer demand, and competition to determine the profitability of a discrete investment in new production factors that can be readily integrated in production in short order. 
4.  On longer timelines, firms encounter fundamental uncertainty, manifest in an incapacity to forecast technological and market conditions that do not yet exist.  As such, investments in factors that require longer timelines to fully integrate into production are accompanied by uncertain estimations on profitability.    
5.  The relative liquidity of any given capital investment, considered in relation to alternative investments in productive capital and/or non-productive financial investments, must be taken into account by entrepreneurial decision makers, in the event that capital investments that take time to integrate into production come on line under technological and market conditions that render them less profitable than previous estimations would have indicated.  The existence of market institutions (e.g. markets for used capital equipment) can function as a buffer against the relatively illiquid nature of certain investments.       

Tuesday, May 24, 2016

A Marshallian Theory of the Firm VI (Microeconomics)

The Conceptual, Geo-spatial, and Informational/Technological Boundaries of the Market

This section is offered as an ontological aside to explain, in part, what we mean when we talk about the market in Marshallian theory.  Again, in our previous Walrasian/Paretian theoretic approach this problem is reasoned away entirely by subsuming all markets within a spatio-temporally integrated system in which an all-encompassing rationalistic logic (tâtonnement) strictly governs the evolution of the system and defines its ontological dimensions, to the extent that these are even up for discussion.  As a construction of rigorous empiricist epistemological principles, Marshallian theory cannot reason away the space and time of markets.  It absolutely has to come to terms with the particular ways in which real economic actors negotiate ontological complexities in order to produce, exchange, and consume goods and services.  
                 For our present purposes, we can abstract from the problem of time, limiting our present inquiry to the theoretic short run.  However, we still need to resolve the problem of market space, a conception that is being rendered more complex as real economies assume a more fully global scale of operations.  Moreover, we need to specify certain conceptual conditions governing the unity of market and establishing potential cleavages separating distinct markets.  Emphatically, the goods and/or services that exchange in individual markets must, by definition, be homogeneous in character.  In the absence of homogeneity, pricing mechanisms would have to account for qualitative differences between goods and/or services being exchanged that would otherwise impact competition between suppliers, inhibiting uniform competitive pricing.  Effectively, we would be forced to adopt some sort of hedonic pricing methodology that could track qualitative differences between goods or services offered by different firms, where each of the goods or services being exchanged constitutes a near perfect substitute for those offered by other firms.  
        Beyond homogeneity of the commodities exchanged, we require a relatively broad diffusion of information on the commodities themselves and the firms offering them to participating consuming agents.  The wider the transmission of information on products, pricing, and other relevant transaction details, the more geographically expansive will be the market.  Ancillary to the issue of information diffusion, we need to consider how technologies enable the assemblage of information by  both producing and consuming agents.  The extent to which agents on both sides of the market are able to consolidate buying and selling information determines the extent to which the market will approach perfect competition.  In the limit, as information becomes perfectly distributed among all buyers and sellers (barring institutional barriers to entry into markets), we approach a state of perfect competition analogous to a Walrasian/Paretian general equilibrium system.  It will remain, however, my contention that markets consistent with Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis never realize this degree of information diffusion.  Rather, limitations on the diffusion of information critically define the boundaries between market structures.
          For Marshallian theory, the conceptual boundaries of the market are ultimately grounded in the capacity to achieve a single equilibrium price toward which all individual prices for the commodity in exchange tend to approach.  In this respect, any aggregation of buyers and sellers, however geographically concentrated or dispersed, assembled to transact exchanges of a single, relatively homogeneous good or service in which the price of the commodity approaches a single value across all exchanges, must be labeled a single market.   Part of the problem delineating conceptual boundaries here may arise from the connections between market exchanges and concomitant production processes manifest in the notion of a supply chain.  Market prices and quantities must be shaped, to a significant degree, by preceding production and exchange processes, at least as much as they are shaped by competition between suppliers and consumers within a given discrete market.  Notwithstanding, there must be some sorts of determinate spatial connections unifying agents at the temporal instance of an exchange, and these need to be specified to define what we mean by the space of a market.  That is to say, the space of a market is, by definition, determined by the processes of negotiation and exchange between buying and selling parties, whether or not the prices, quantities, and other transaction details are shaped by exogenous processes. 
       In his Principles of Economics (8th edition(1920), Book V, Chapter 1. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd, located at: http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP28.html#Bk.V,Ch.I. Henceforth: Marshall (1920)), Marshall clearly emphasized the centrality of communications technologies in establishing a singular equilibrium market price.  Referencing technologies in place when the Principles were initially published in 1890, Marshall noted that "the general tendency of the telegraph, the printing press and steam traffic is to extend the area over which (equilibrating) influences act and increase their force."  Thus, he further argues that, in the case of commodities that are relatively portable, non-perishable, and in general demand across all geographically defined economies, the advance of telecommunications technologies must enforce a tendency of price equilibration across all sites in which the commodity is exchanged, a tendency that makes rare metals, in particular, logical sources of commodity money.  He, likewise, discounts the effects of transportation costs and customs boundaries as impediments to the force of competition between buyers and sellers across certain key commodity markets, again, characterized by portability and non-perishability.  
            Pricing mechanisms in contexts where commodities are relatively perishable and/or non-portable demonstrate much more geographical variability.  Incapacity to transport goods from place to place becomes a key impediment to the uniformity of prices across regions, transcending informational concerns even as communications technologies enable continuous, real-time information on quantities supplied and demanded between regions.  Consequently, as goods become relatively non-portable or transportation costs become a significant constraint on portability, market boundaries arise between geographic regions.  Conversely, every technological advance in transportation and/or, in the case of perishable goods, storage capacities, must expand market boundaries, constituting, in the limit, globally scaled markets.  Thus, at the start of the Nineteenth century, cereal grain markets on the East coast of the US were relatively localized, defined by the capacities of farmers to bring wheat, corn, and/or milled flour into seaboard towns by horse cart.  By the 1830s, the market was expanded by the presence of aquatic transportation infrastructure investments (e.g. barge canals), connecting the East coast to better, more productive arable land in Trans-Appalachia (Ohio, Michigan, Indiana).  As a result, cereal grain prices declined in coastal cities and became more uniform across formerly distinct regional markets.  Today, American markets for perishable produce may include oranges from South Africa, asparagus from Peru, and red peppers from the Netherlands, even as, a generation ago, the seasonal availability of produce within discrete American regional markets (i.e. metropolitan areas) or across regions within the larger geographical space of North America constituted definite constraints on the availability of certain categories of produce.  Such changes can be accounted for, in part, through transportation advances and, additionally, through technological advances on the genetic engineering of agricultural produce, rendering it relatively less perishable as it travels eight to ten thousand miles to market.  
               In the limit, as technology annihilates the geographic boundaries constituting regional markets to impose a single, competitive equilibrium market price, we are confronted with the potential for perfect competition, through which all firms must conform to a zero profit condition as they exhaust all available mechanisms to reduce costs and attract consumers.  The problem here remains, however, the universality of access to information on pricing and quantities supplied and demanded at divergent points across geographic space.  In a Walrasian/Paretian economy, information is always distributed perfectly across household agents on the producer and consumer sides of all markets.  In Marshallian theory, we lack such a perfect distribution of information.  On the contrary, we face the reality that agents approach markets with divergent capacities to accumulate information on quantities and pricing.  As such, price competition exerts an uneven influence, even within geographically compact market spaces.  Is it reasonable to expect that a shirt, with relatively homogeneous design and qualitative characteristics, should sell at exactly the same price between multiple retail outlets in a large shopping mall?  It will only if consumers and suppliers are fully cognizant of the availability of a virtually identical product at multiple retailers in the same compact retail market space and consumers are willing to enforce a common minimum price across all suppliers by purchasing identical products only at the minimum available price.     
            This consideration of the conceptual boundaries of the market in regard to the enforcement of a single equilibrium market price must simultaneously exist in conjunction with the presence of diverse technological/communications vehicles through which information on prices and quantities can be communicated across space among consuming and supplying agents.  Such communicative means both enable firms to harmonize their production and pricing strategies in relation to competitors and estimated consumer reservation prices, and enable consumers to make purchasing decisions in relation to the offer prices of diverse firms.  By communications vehicles, I mean to include everything from person-to-person "word of mouth" between suppliers and/or consumers to professional marketing campaigns to accumulated information derived from electronic social media (e.g. internet bulletin boards).  Emphatically, every conceivable means by which agents are enabled to collect information on pricing and quantities across multiple supplying firms providing relatively homogeneous commodities must be included within the communications vehicles associated with a particular firm or across firms constituting a market.  As such, the real space of a market may include both the physical space of exchange sites (e.g. retail outlets) and the virtual spaces of electronic marketplaces, each shaped by the particular range of communications technologies by which buyers and sellers transmit information and negotiate the terms of exchange.      
             Physically speaking, our understanding of the spatiality of markets must incorporate some consideration of the spatial footprints of material processes of exchange and, especially in regard to services, of production and consumption.  Where do agents on both sides of the market actually transact the contractual details of the deal, where are media of exchange (i.e. currency) transferred between transacting parties, and do the processes of production and consumption occur simultaneously and in a co-located space?  All of these processes must occur in real physical space in so far as all of the agents are real human agents, occupying, transiting through, and interacting within real physical space, even if two agents are separated by thousands of miles across an intervening virtual/electronic medium.  It may quite often be the case that exchanges occur with prices that are determined before transacting parties ever come together, especially if the market is quite large and the commodity exchanged quite homogeneous.  However, if we want to come to a more generalized consideration of the spatiality of the market as an institution through which two parties engage in a contractual exchange, then we have to consider all the potential spatial contexts through which such an exchange may be formalized and actualized.   
            Approaching such an analysis of the spatiality of the exchange process, I would contend that we encounter, in most circumstances, a hybrid articulation of physical and virtual spaces, combining to constitute a network, approximately in the sense advanced by actor network theory (i.e. agents performing actions at given places and times, actively distributed across space and time through technological vehicles).  The operative principle governing the market, in this manner, becomes interpersonal communication across space and, probably, time mediated through communications technologies.  At certain times and in certain spatial/social contexts, such communications might have been mediated by rudimentary vehicles (e.g. direct face-to-face bargaining between buyers and sellers), but, over time, the communications vehicles have become more complex, even if the terms of negotiation have been truncated by the influence of other actors (e.g. accumulation of information on prices offered by other firms or other consumers).  
            If the market is a network, then, spatially, it must be innately discontinuous, characterized geographically by sets of nodes, representing the spatiality of buyers and sellers, coming together simultaneously by means of some communications technology or in diverse temporal sequences, reflecting the capacities of particular communications technologies to store information on pricing and quantities for prolonged periods until exchange processes can be actualized.  That is to say, the particular nodes constituting the network possess a spatial footprint that only combines with other nodes when particular technological vehicles are deployed to accumulate information, advance offers, convey decisions, and transfer exchange media in multiple directions.  The articulation of the network may exist in a continuous state of flux, as agents enter and exit, and the temporal continuity of the network, per se, can only be actualized to the extent that agents remain, at their particular nodes, actively performing exchange.  It is the action of exchange, in itself, which actualizes the market.  Outside of the exchange process, the market ceases to exist even if the communications vehicles remain to store information for exchanges that may occur at some unknown moment in the future.  To the extent that firms exist with inventories ready to be sold at a set of stipulated (or negotiable) prices, the market may remain a potentiality that can only be realized when a buyer comes along a agrees to enter into exchange at existing prices (or to renegotiate).  
            Before I conclude this section, I want to advance some additional conceptual and/or geo-spatial problems that enter into this Marshallian experiential/networked conception of markets.  First, the forms of competition or non-competition must impact the degree to which there is a multi-directional flow of information on supplier offer prices and consumer reservation prices, but such a truncation of information flows will not necessarily impact the spatial articulation of the network.  That is to say, if the market is characterized by qualitative/monopolistic competition, monopoly, or oligopoly, then the flow of information on offer prices from firms may be restricted by the limited nature of competition, but the spatial articulation of buyers and sellers may remain unchanged in relation to the articulation of a relatively competitive network.  The logic here resides in the relative independence of processes through which consumer demand is produced as a function of individual utility maximization in relation to the potential for consolidation of production/restriction of competition among suppliers.  Conclusively, the capacity to maintain a competitive market arises, on the one hand, from the relative homogeneity of the product exchanged and, on the other hand, to the informational and technological barriers to entry for potential new firms within discrete regional and/or global markets.  These issues are at least partially distinct from the question of how many consumers will enter the market.    
             Second, certain matters on social context might be construed as pertinent to our larger conception of market spatiality.  Notably, is the degree of urbanization pertinent to the question of market expansiveness?  To answer this question, we would have to explicitly define urbanization and the relationship of urbanization to the scale and/or network connectivity of market institutions.  This document is not the place for an extensive discourse on the nature of urbanization or to contemplate the conditions that transfer a social context from non-urban into urban.  However, it will help to advance a tentative proposition on the nature of the urban in relation to our theorization of market spatiality and, especially, the idea of markets as networks.  Pointedly, the urban can be understood as a particular condition in the network articulation of multiple overlapping layers of social processes in which technologies enable network transmissions to speed up, slow down, shorten, or lengthen.  In the terminologies of communications networks, urban places operate as hubs, receiving network transmissions and transforming them to facilitate their reception at terminal nodes.  In science fiction terms, urban spaces are like transporter/teleportation machines, transforming the ways in which goods, services, and information move.  As such, the urban critically implies the centrality of the urban place/city as a constitutive element within an interurban network, articulated through multiple interconnected hubs such that network transmissions invariably occur through the space of hubs.  This capacity to regulate network communications processes makes urban places important to social theories, in general, and to our theory of the market, in particular.  
               If we accept this proposition regarding the definition of the urban, then our conception of urban market processes must involve exchange processes associated with proximity to hubs, through which network transmissions can be made to shorten, lengthen, speed up, or slow down.  Conversely, non-urban market processes must involve exchange processes within strictly self-contained networks, where exchanges operate on a strict point-to-point basis not mediated by hubs that can speed up, slow down, shorten, or length communications.  As such, urban market processes involve a different range of communications technological vehicles than non-urban market processes.  To the extent that we accept such a dichotomy between urban and non-urban markets, we have a foundational concept for interregional market processes and, in the limit, for global market activity.  Market globalization is a phenomenon driven by the existence of urban markets as transitional hubs, sites where goods and services in exchange and the means of circulation to pay for them speed up or slow down between the terminal nodes where buyers and sellers reside.  
               Furthermore, if we accept an axiomatic connection between the urban and long distance communications media, such that market processes over relatively long distances must extend through urban spaces, then it may be worth asking whether the urban market is a terminal condition in the evolution of market activity, as markets stretch to longer and longer distances across geographic space.  What forces might impede the encroachment of long distance media on relatively localized market activity or otherwise promote the re-localization of markets that had previously extended much longer distances across geographic space?  A partial answer to this question must be afforded by the diffusion of communications technologies, facilitating information flow across space.  It must, likewise, take the degree of price competition within individual, regional markets and, hence, the strategies of local firms to prevent market penetration by outside potential competitors.  In short, the relatively urban and non-urban character of market activity (and, thus, the sustainability of regional market boundaries against the tendency of globalization) is shaped by the same forces that we have discussed over the course of this section.                            
           Attempting to summarize the arguments advanced in this section:
1.  Markets conceptually require the relative homogeneity of goods and services exchanged.  If absolute homogeneity does not exist, then we need some hedonic pricing methodology to comprehend how seemingly distinct goods and services are unified by a common institution generating equilibrium pricing through competition. 
2.  The geographic expansiveness of market space is determined, in part, by the diffusion of information on pricing and quantities among buyers and sellers, which, in turn, is shaped by the range of communications technology vehicles available to diffuse and assemble information for supplying and consuming agents.
3.  Goods and services that are relatively portable and non-perishable/non-degradable across geographic space will tend to have more geographically expansive market spaces than goods and services that are relatively non-portable and/or perishable/degradable.  In the case of the latter, markets may be more geographically compact at a given moment, but technological change in transportation/transmission and storage may expand the geography of such markets over time.
4.  The defining characteristic of an individual market is the presence of a unique equilibrium price toward which prices for competing firms offering relatively homogeneous goods and services tend to approach.
5.  The maintenance of a single equilibrium price in a given market space demands the presence of communications technological vehicles, capable of diffusing information on prices and quantitative offers from individual firms and reservation prices from consumers.  Some of these vehicles may be relatively rudimentary, functioning only in the immediate vicinity of sellers, while other may be technologically advanced, stretching the discontinuous space of markets out of thousands of miles on an instantaneous time frame of information transfers.  
6.  Every assemblage of buying and selling agents, connected by communications technologies, constitutes the market as a network, possibly articulated entirely in real physical space, possibly articulated as a hybrid of physical and virtual space.  As a rule, such networks are spatially discontinuous, connecting agents by means of communications technologies physically separated by real, physical non-market spaces.
7.  The spatial articulation of the market, constituted by transfers of information between buying and selling agents, is not necessarily affected by the competitive nature of the market, which simply impacts the number of selling agents and the capacity for reduction of equilibrium prices to levels that might be obtained in relatively competitive markets.  
8.  The characterization of urban markets reflects proximity to technological means for accelerated/long-distance communications, constituting a particular physical location as a network hub, facilitating connections between physically distanciated buying and selling nodes.  We define such hubs as urban spaces.  Non-urban markets achieve information transfers between buying and selling agents in the absence of intervening network hubs.       
    
           
       
                
        

Tuesday, April 5, 2016

A Marshallian Theory of the Firm V (Microeconomics)

Marshallian Firms in Short Run Competitive Markets

This section seeks to definitively situate the Marshallian firm, as a supply-side agent, in output markets at least roughly characterized by price competition between large numbers of suppliers, facing, in turn, large numbers of demand-side agents, where the distribution of information among agents on both sides of the market may not be perfect but is sufficient to ensure that short run cost disparities cannot generate durable cumulative pricing advantages.  Assuming in this respect that we are dealing with circumstances approaching a perfectly competitive market, the meaningful comparison that I mean to draw relates to the performance of perfect competition for the Walrasian/Paretian firm.  Our treatment of the latter emphasized the captive nature of the firm, sandwiched between two household utility maximization problems that wholly determine an equilibrium vector of relative prices for all outputs and production factors by means of tâtonnement.  Taking both factor and output prices as given and producing with technologies characterized by linear homogeneity/constant returns to scale, I argued that the output supply curves faced by Walrasian/Paretian firms are perfectly elastic/horizontal at the level of the output price, defined either in monetary terms or in relation to a numeraire.  The point is that, for any static moment in the operation of a given market in a general equilibrium system, the collective decisions of all participating households, as consumers and owners of production factors, completely determine pricing for all firms, and decisions on production quantities are universally determined by the technological contours of production functions.  
               As we have argued so far, the particular conditions on factor supply (fixed versus variable) that govern the operation of Marshallian firms in the short run make their approach to short run market equilibrium different.  Most critically, Marshallian firms face increasing marginal costs as they increase outputs in the short run.  The entire range of the Marshallian short run supply schedule for individual firms, from the firm's shut down boundary to positive infinity, is characterized by increasing marginal costs.  If we accept the principle that all perfectly competitive firms take prices as given, then pricing and production decisions for a Marshallian entrepreneur should be relatively simple, increasing marginal costs notwithstanding.  Complications arise, however, when we impose restrictions on the production decisions made by entrepreneurs, as in the last section where we constrain the entrepreneur in our automotive remanufacturing operation to only hire workers on a full work day rate.  In general, any circumstance where we impose constraints on decision-makers for firms, we create a space for production and/or pricing strategies that would disappear if we enable decision-makers to operate with complete freedom.
               The linchpin in our account on Marshallian firms operating in perfect competition is the short run marginal cost pricing rule.  Restated, every firm, as a rational profit maximizing/cost minimizing entity, will produce a quantity of output at which the marginal revenue received from the sale of the last additional unit will equal the marginal cost of producing the last additional unit, or:



Proceeding again through the logic of this condition under the assumption that a firm is dealing with increasing short run marginal costs as a function of quantity produced, if the firm produces a quantity where marginal cost is less than the marginal revenue received for the last unit produced, then the last unit it produces will cost less than the revenue that it receives for the unit, but it will forego additional revenues that it could have received if it had produced additional units at increasing marginal costs.  This lost revenue represents a tangible (opportunity) cost to the firm that can only be eliminated by increasing production.  Alternatively, if it produces quantities up to the point at which the marginal cost of the last unit produced exceeds the marginal revenues that it receives for the unit, then this unit is sold at a loss.  The only way to eliminate this loss is to decrease production.  Producing under the condition that marginal revenue equals marginal cost eliminates either opportunity costs from producing inadequate quantities and production costs in excess of marginal revenues from producing superabundant quantities.    
              This condition applies equally to Walrasian/Paretian firms as to Marshallian firms.  In the case of the former, marginal costs simply remain constant and equal to average costs per unit at a profit maximizing/cost minimizing factor combination, where the firm operates under constant returns/constant costs per unit.  Thus, under perfect competition, a Walrasian/Paretian firm produces a quantity of output consistent with its financing constraint at which the marginal cost of producing the last unit of output is equal to the additional revenue that it receives at the equilibrium relative price for the output.  I failed to emphasize the condition, on the other hand, with Walrasian/Paretian firms because their financing constraints remain their critical output barrier - if firms can always maintain a perfect profit maximizing balance of production factors then there is never a question that marginal costs will ever diverge from their average along their expansion paths.  For Marshallian firms, divergence from an optimal expansion path is the rule in the short run.
                 With regard to perfect competition, marginal revenue is continuously equivalent to the output market price and, thus, for all additional units of output sold, the marginal revenue of the last unit of output is constant.  Intuitively, this should be the case.  If firms cannot affect market output through their behavior among relatively large numbers of producers, then the output price should always be consonant with the revenue received by firms for each additional unit of output.  Under less than perfect competition, this might not be the case.  Oligopolistic firms and monopolies are relatively free to impose prices that readily diverge from the prices that would obtain under perfect competition.  Likewise, competitors in markets where information dissemination is sufficiently constrained maintain a capacity to charge prices in excess of those that would operate under perfect competition by virtue of occluded pricing.  In such circumstances, marginal revenue would vary as a function of output quantities.  In this document, we are consciously assuming that, to the extent that agents possess imperfect information, no information disproportionalities exist that might enable certain agents to take advantage of competitors or contracting parties.  
                Having considered the supply side of output markets in relation to the short run marginal cost pricing rule, we should also evaluate the demand side, which, effectively, constituted the centerpiece of our explanation of Walrasian/Paretian output markets.  For the latter, we argued that all commodity production and exchange is ultimately grounded in the utility enjoyed by households from consumption of goods and services.  The maximization of utility in consumption constitutes a series of mathematical arguments at the level of each individual household utility function, in conjunction with the minimization of dis-utility from factor supply, determining how much of each good or service should be produced, how much financing/factor supply each firm should receive in order to produce such quantities under the most efficient existing technologies, and how much each household should receive in proportion to their supply of production factors.  The fact that a single utility function, at the level of each individual household, uniquely contributes to answering each of these questions at the level of the larger economic system establishes the centrality of household utility maximization to the functioning of a general equilibrium system.  
                We cannot accord this degree of centrality to utility maximization by demand-side agents in our consideration of Marshallian output market consumers.  While it is not my intention to elaborate a broader theory of utility maximization by Marshallian consumption agents in this context, we need to specify at least a rough, partial definition of the Marshallian consumer in order to situate the firm as its other in output market price determination.  Without delving into the rationalistic terrain of utility functions, the most evident means of defining the consumption agent would involve an empirical analysis of demand patterns within markets characterized by a relative fluidity of market prices where, among other things, qualitative characteristics of the good or service transacted remain fairly constant over the analyzed period.  As such, the point is to establish the contours of a market demand schedule and, to a certain. limited extent, to probe its microfoundations at the level of the individual/household.  In these terms, we can definitively argue that short run Marshallian market demand functions are generally negatively sloped in relation to price and that this negative relationship, at a microfoundational level, reflects the diminishing marginal utility of individual consuming agents as we increase the quantities of each commodity consumed.  Beyond this basic reflection, we might further encounter a broad portfolio of theoretic concerns in the demand theory, involving the differentiation between Marshallian additive, cardinal utility functions and Walrasian/Paretian generalized utility functions.  These issues need not concern us here, however.
                   At the level of individual markets, Marshallian theory compels us to simply add up all of the individual production and consumption agents on each side of the market in order to compile schedules enumerating how many units of a given commodity can be supplied at a given price and how many units will be demanded at the same price.  Let us say, for example, that we have a given individual market for a particular, well defined and relatively homogeneous commodity, retail raw whole chicken breasts, over a one week period, in a regionally-defined small metropolitan market (< 750,000 inhabitants).  Nine relatively large retail suppliers make up a majority of the market, regularly selling slightly over fifty percent of total outputs on average.  The remainder of the market is divided among dozens of smaller retail outlets.  Table 5 represents a schedule of output quantities, aggregating the three largest suppliers, six middle-range suppliers, and the remaining small suppliers, delineating marginal, average fixed, variable, and total costs.  

SuppliersQuantity (xwcb)Marginal CostAverage Fixed CostAverage Variable CostAverage Total Cost
3 Largest1122020.531.872.4
3 Largest144002.20.411.962.36
3 Largest176702.40.342.032.37
3 Largest199502.60.32.12.4
3 Largest221202.80.272.172.44
3 Largest2380030.252.232.48
3 Largest249203.20.242.272.51
Middle 6 748020.651.922.57
Middle 6 124002.20.392.032.42
Middle 6 159602.40.312.112.42
Middle 6 172902.60.282.162.44
Middle 6 181702.80.272.192.46
Middle 6 1870030.262.222.48
Middle 6 195803.20.252.262.51
Remainder330020.811.982.79
Remainder132002.20.22.152.35
Remainder233702.40.122.252.37
Remainder292602.60.092.332.42
Remainder387102.80.072.442.51
Remainder4250030.062.492.55
Remainder445003.20.062.522.58
Table 5: Costs for Retail, Raw Whole Chicken Breasts (in lbs) in a Small Metropolitan Regional Market for a Given Week at Marginal Costs from $2.00 to 3.20 for Three Supplier Categories           
Under the short run marginal cost pricing rule, the firms represented above should be willing to supply quantities of output up to the marginal cost of the last unit produced.  Acknowledging that we are running over the theoretic complexities involved in full-blown micro-foundational analysis of production at the level of each individual firm in the interest of simplification, table 5 aggregates output quantities for the three size categories of roughly analogous firms, valuing additional outputs at each marginal cost level for each category of firms at the marginal cost (i.e. for the three largest firms, 14400 - 11220 = 3180 additional outputs are collectively valued at $2.20 per unit across all three firms).  If we add up outputs in each of the three size categories for production at a price/marginal cost of $2.00 for the last unit(s) produced, we get a total output of 22,000 lbs of raw whole chicken breasts supplied.  
               Approaching the demand-side of the market, incorporating thousands of households consuming divergent quantities of raw whole chicken breasts for cooking at home, we can, for each individual/household, compile a set of reservation prices, at which each individual/household might delineate a monetized value on different quantities of the product being consumed as a register for the marginal utility enjoyed by the individual/household from consumption of the product as it increases the quantities it consumes.  For a given household, for example, two pounds of whole chicken breasts might command a reservation price of $6.00.  A third pound might, conversely, command $5.25 and a fourth $4.00, with successive pounds valued at even lower reservation prices.  The point here, for Marshallian theory as for all other Neoclassical approaches, is that the marginal utility enjoyed by consumers diminishes with each successive unit consumed, matched by a diminution of the monetary value that consumers are willing to expend to obtain larger quantities.  On an aggregate level, this constitutes the (micro-founded) explanation for a downward sloping market demand schedule.  
               Elaborating, if we consolidate the quantities demanded by all households, at each reservation price, then we can define a market demand schedule in which each each point on the schedule represents the highest reservation price at which a given quantity of output enjoys positive quantity demanded from a subset of consumers.  For example, let us say that consumers demand 4,000 lbs of whole chicken breasts at $6.00/lb.  By interpretation, this quantity consolidates households like the one mentioned previously that would purchase two pounds of whole chicken breasts for $6.00/lb.  Some consumers, no doubt, demand more than two pounds while many consume less or nothing.  The point is that the total quantity demanded across the market at a price of $6.00/lb reflects an aggregation of quantities demanded by each consuming agent engaged in the market if only to conclude that $6.00/lb is too high to justify the purchase of any whole chicken breasts.  With this in mind, table 6 consolidates a truncated set of reservation prices across consuming agents in the market for whole chicken breasts and a set of marginal costs across all producing agents from each of the size categories represented in table 5.

Quantity (Xwcb)Marginal CostReservation Price
2200023.58
400002.22.91
570002.42.7
665002.62.6
790002.82.53
8500032.46
890003.22.42
Table 6: Supplier Marginal Costs and Consumer Reservation Prices for Retail, Raw Whole Chicken Breasts at a Range of Quantities in Small Metropolitan Regional Market on a Weekly Time Frame
Approaching the table 6 data graphically, we can articulate the basic Marshallian cross, depicting output supply and demand schedules with a short run market equilibrium of 66,500 lbs of raw whole chicken breasts exchanging at an equilibrium market price of $2.60 per pound.  We illustrate this result in figure 15.  
   Figure 15: Short Run Market Supply and Demand Schedules for Retail Raw Whole Chicken Breasts on a Weekly Time Frame in a Small Metropolitan Regional Market
If we now transition from the level of the market to the level of individual firms, we can specify the basic logic of the short run marginal cost pricing rule with the specific production technologies in place for individual suppliers.  Let us say, for example, that we have a single small firm, among the aggregate above labeled "Remainder."  For a wide range of prices, the costs incurred by the firm remain too high to justify producing any output.  At $2.00 per pound, for example, we can assume that the average variable costs for the firm exceed $2.00 per pound of raw whole chicken breasts produced for sale.  As such, the firm produces zero output.  In fact, it only begins to produce positive outputs at a market price of $2.40, where it produces 30 lbs for sale.  The marginal cost, average fixed cost, average variable cost, and average total costs incurred by the firm at various output market prices are introduced in table 7 below.
Quantity (xwcb)Market PriceMarginal CostAverage Fixed CostAverage Variable CostAverage Total Cost
02----
02.2----
302.42.40.292.222.51
452.62.60.192.352.54
552.82.80.162.432.59
63330.142.52.64
673.23.20.132.542.67
Table 7: Short Run Output Supply for an Individual Small Firm in the Market for Retail Raw Whole Chicken Breasts on a Weekly Time Frame in a Small Metropolitan Market
Considered graphically, our market equilibrium price of $2.60 represents a hard constraint for the firm.  As a single participant within a perfectly competitive market in which a very large number of competing suppliers operate, the firm cannot meaningfully affect market prices by varying output quantities.  Rather, it can only expect to sell all available outputs that it can produce at the equilibrium price, consistent with its short run marginal cost pricing profit maximization condition.  Thus, at a market price of $2.60, it supplies 45 lbs of raw whole chicken breasts, selling all that it produces for the market.  This outcome is shown graphically, in relation to the market equilibrium outcome, in figure 16.

 Figure 16: Short Run Supply for an Individual Firm in a Perfectly Competitive Market for Retail, Raw Whole Chicken Breasts, with Marginal Cost, Average Total Costs, and Average Variable Costs for Various Market Prices
The larger point here is that individual firms, either at this relatively finite scale of operation or at larger scales, are unable to palpable affect market quantities and, thus, unable to impact the equilibrium output market price.  Hence, in figure 16, our individual firm faces a perfectly elastic demand curve at the equilibrium output market price for their product.  This condition graphically reiterates our previous conclusion that the marginal revenue that the firm receives from the last unit it sells is strictly equal to the output market price in equilibrium.  
                Before concluding this section, it is worth elaborating on the issue of short run profit in competitive markets.  This will not be the last word on profit in our discussion of Marshallian theory, but avoiding some discussion of profit at this point would leave an untenable loose end in our theory of short run competitive markets.  As such, we need to differentiate between three distinct concepts pertinent to our discussion: accounting profit, economic profit, and normal profit.  Accounting profit constitutes the difference between the total monetary revenues received by the firm and its total monetary costs.  That is to say, it is the difference between what the firm pays out in money for factors of production and other production or transaction costs and the money that it receives from sales and other revenue sources.  Operating with this definition of accounting profit in relation to our example of the market for retail raw whole chicken breasts, our individual small firm earns an accounting profit of $.06 per pound of chicken breasts ($2.60 - 2.54 = .06), giving it a total accounting profit from the sale of raw whole chicken breasts of $2.70 over forty-five pounds of chicken breasts at a market price of $2.60 (presumably this firm is offering many, many other, more profitable items to its customers!).  
            Economic profit, by contrast, constitutes the difference between total monetary revenues and total monetary costs plus opportunity costs, a category including implicit costs to the firm from undertaking production strategies that do not strictly maximize profits in accordance with the variability of its production factors.  In these terms, if, at a market price of $2.60 per pound, our firm decided to produce only thirty pounds of raw whole chicken breasts for sale at an average total cost of $2.51 per pound, then, at $.09 accounting profit per pound, it would achieve the same total accounting profit across thirty pounds that it would obtain from producing forty-five pounds (30 x .09 = $2.70).  However, by only producing thirty pounds, the firm foregoes $39 in additional revenues from the sale of an additional fifteen pounds of chicken breasts, at an average cost of $2.54.  The accounting profit here does not change, but we have to add an implicit opportunity cost of $39 to account for the firm's failure to maximize profits subject to the marginal cost pricing rule.  In per unit terms, we would be deducting $.03 from each pound of chicken breasts sold by the firm at the lower quantity in order to equalize the rate of profit in relation to total costs in both circumstances.  In both circumstances, therefore, the firm incurs total costs (monetary costs plus implicit/opportunity costs) of $114.30 whether it produces thirty pounds of raw whole chicken breasts or forty-five pounds, where, in the latter case, all of its opportunity costs have been eliminated by producing in accordance with the marginal cost pricing rule.  
          By defining economic profit in relation to opportunity costs, we are explicitly linking the definition to the marginal cost pricing rule.  This is true for competitive firms, but it is also true for imperfectly competitive firms, where marginal costs and marginal revenues diverge from the reservation prices of consumers.  In a specifically competitive Marshallian context, however, where short run market conditions may be expected to deviate from average conditions over longer term periods, the conception of economic profit carries an additional signification.  Notably, economic profits are conceived as short run deviations between average total costs and market prices that are expected to disappear over longer term periods.  That is to say, if the retail market for raw whole chicken breasts was known to be a market site in which substantial profits were to be made, then more firms would enter the market in order to compete for a share of the excess returns.  As they did so, market quantities supplied would increase in relation to quantities demanded, driving down the market price and eliminating opportunities for excess returns over average total costs.  
         In the above example, I intentionally posit conditions in which the largest firms participating in the market encounter the largest deviations between market price and average total cost, suggesting that there are scale economies to be exploited in the market, even if such economies are not sufficient to completely eliminate competition where levels of market demand are sufficient to impel marginal producers to enter the market.  The point is that, as marginal entrants approach the market, economic profits are diminished, even for firms with the largest average total cost advantages.  Emphatically, the portrait of the market that I am advancing here is not Walrasian/Paretian.  All firms are not the same, and some firms hold strategic advantages that cannot be entirely competed away.  Entrants do not appear automatically to instantaneously compete economic profits away in short run circumstances where they arise.  If in a Walrasian/Paretian general equilibrium system we are confronted with iron laws of rationality that ensure the continuous impossibility of economic profit, then economic profit appears as a regular and dynamic reality for Marshallian firms, one that dynamically shapes the composition of suppliers within markets.
          This leaves us with a final, peculiar, and, yet, indispensable conception, normal profit.  Normal profit describes an expectation relative to market activity that an investment in production will generate a particular threshold ratio of returns to total costs.  In this circumstance, my conception of total cost will, effectively, reflect our conception of economic profits, to the extent that I am assuming full conformity with the marginal cost pricing rule.  The circumstances associated with the formation of such expectations of highly varied.  For his part, Marshall committed Book VI, Chapter VIII of the Principles to an elaboration of the conditions governing normal profit.  In the end, my interpretation of Marshall's conclusions are primarily motivational.  We cannot come to any particular definition of a normal rate of profit, in either a macroeconomic sense or in terms of any particular market activity.  Rather, normal profits are contextual in every sense, and regional, temporal, and technological contexts drive the expectations of investors and entrepreneurs.  
            In the case above, we might conceive of a threshold rate of normal profit from the production and exchange of raw whole chicken breasts between two-and-one half and five percent of total costs, where, again, we interpret normal profit as a ratio rather than a raw quantity.  Such a rate appears, on its face, indicative of the activity represented above, where larger producers achieve larger rates of return from scale economies and smaller producers appear to just scratch the surface of desired rates of return.  
          A larger concern here involves the nature of expectations relative to longer term outcomes.  It might be the case that, for any particular short run period, firms are able to meet expectations for profit from a particular set of investments in production factors.  However, insofar as such expectations are framed by outcomes of previous short run periods and contemporaneous macroeconomic phenomena (e.g. aggregate polling on consumer and producer confidence), every set of expectations on normal profit rates need to be taken in a specific temporal and spatial context.  How might the geographic expanse of the market for a particular good or service or of a range of allied goods and services shape a certain set of expectations for rates of return?  If a market is seasonally oriented or otherwise temporally configured in ways that promote alternating moments of superabundant and slack demand for particular goods and services, then shouldn't we expect to see particular market engagement strategies by firms to harmonize profit expectations in temporally varied markets?  How do general macroeconomic trends on growth and decline of economic activity impact the profitability expectations of firms producing individual goods or services for individual markets?  It may have been my experience that the market for retail raw chicken breasts can be characterized in accordance with fairly uniform trends in market demand relative to seasonal and cyclical phenomena, but this reflection does not imply that patterns of demand and, hence, expectations for profit are apt to be wholly constant over time even in this particular market.                  Closing this short reflection on normal profit in short run Marshallian market analysis, I want to briefly introduce a subject that will return in our critique of this Marshallian theory of the firm.  If we continue to hold that Marshallian firms should follow the short run marginal cost pricing rule and that, hence, our conception of normal profit will reflect economic profit (i.e. minimization of both explicit/monetary and implicit/opportunity costs), then we are left with a basic question on how the existence of normal profits, as an excess return over factor costs, should be interpreted.  For our previous Walrasian/Paretian theory of the firm, we avoided this question entirely: there are no economic profits in a seamlessly integrated general equilibrium economy characterized by perfectly distributed information and, therefore, we do not need to explain the source of something that we axiomatically assume to not exist.  In Marshallian theory, economic profits do, in fact, exist, at least in the short run, and their existence shapes expectations and impacts the growth and decline of production for individual markets in relation to consumer demand.  Normal profit is formative to the overarching functions of a dynamic economic system.  If this is true, then we have to derive some meaningful explanation for the persistence of an expected rate of economic profits where we simultaneously adopt an assumption that price competition and the entry of marginal firms into profitable market contexts will drive economic profit to zero in the long run.  Somehow, persistent positive economic profit has to be baked into our explanation of market systems.  
          It will be my contention that Alfred Marshall was content to live with the contradiction implied by these conditions in the interest of conceding the irreducible complexity of market systems.  On the other hand, subsequent Marshallians, with theories inflected by Paretian rationalism, operate with a more mechanical vision of the workings of market systems.  In such theoretic frames, we cannot simply reduce the persistence of economic profit to a peculiarity of market systems.  We require an explanation.  In the Marshallian tradition, such explanations have been configured around returns to immeasurable, intangible factors of production sometimes labeled entrepreneurship, relating profits to risk taking and management of informational imperfections.  It will be my contention that these explanations are one-sided: they adequately justify the existence of normal profit without explaining its source.  Ultimately, it will be my contention that such a source cannot be found within Marshallian theory or the larger Neoclassical tradition.